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This is an opBackground: Oklahoma’s tribal tobacco shops are distributed throughout the state, including in
urban areas. During the time frame of this study, state excise tax rates for cigarettes varied by tribe
and region, and took ﬁve distinct levels, ranging from 5.75 cents to $1.03 per pack.
Purpose: To describe the pricing behavior of these smoke shops in a way that could support
potential increases in the tribal taxation of cigarettes within the state.
Methods: Two waves (2010 and 2011) of site visits were conducted, covering nearly all tribal smoke
shops in the northeastern quarter of the state, an area containing the city of Tulsa and 60% of all
tribal outlets. Researchers recorded representative prices and veriﬁed the tax rate paid (via tax
stamp) for each shop. Data were analyzed in 2013.
Results: Lower-taxed tribal cigarettes tended to be priced at discounts that were even greater than
the differential in tax rates. For example, across waves, the average pack of Marlboros from a shop
with a 5.75-cent tax stamp sold for 52 cents less than the same pack from a 25.75-cent shop and 60
cents less than from a 51.5-cent shop. The minimal inter-tribal price response to the discontinuation
of large quantities of contraband cigarette sales suggests that inter-tribal price competition in the
Tulsa area is not as intense as expected.
Conclusions: Ample scope exists for either unilateral or coordinated cross-tribal tax and price
increases that will increase tribal cigarette tax revenue collections and improve public health.
(Am J Prev Med 2015;48(1S1):S111–S119) & 2015 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).IntroductionRanked by CDC as tied for 40th among the 50states in smoking prevalence, with 23.3% of alladults (and 31.4% of Native American adults)
reporting having smoked within the last month, Okla-
homa confronts a serious public health priority for
tobacco control.1 Cigarette taxation has been accepted
for many years as a primary policy tool for reducing
smoking rates.2 Oklahoma is home to 39 federally
recognized Native American tribes, of which 31 were
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en access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http:shops at the time of this study.3 One obstacle to higher
cigarette taxation in Oklahoma has come from the need
to negotiate and coordinate changes in tax rates across
Oklahoma’s various tribal and non-tribal jurisdictions.4
Before January 1, 2005, when state excise tax rates for
non-tribal shops went up 80 cents per pack, the tribal–
non-tribal differential in state taxes for cigarettes had been
stable at 17.25 cents per pack. In preparation for the 2005
shift in non-tribal rates, state and key tribal leaders
negotiated a round of tax treaties, called “compacts,” that
would coincide with the non-tribal increase. These com-
pacts generally raised the state excise rate on tribal sales to
85.75 cents, maintaining the 17.25-cent per pack advant-
age for tribal outlets. During negotiations, however,
concessions were made for lower state tax rates at tribal
smoke shops located near borders of lower-taxed states.
This yielded a 5.75-cent “exception” rate, for shops mostly
near the Missouri border, and a 25.75-cent “border” rate,
initially applicable to shops along the Texas, Arkansas, and
Kansas borders (later applicable only along the Kansasvier Inc.
//creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Figure 1. Map of tribal smoke shops by tax rate.
Laux et al / Am J Prev Med 2015;48(1S1):S111–S119S112border). Figure 1 provides a map of Oklahoma’s tribal
smoke shops by state tax rate, as of spring 2011.3
Soon after the 2005 tax increase, entrepreneurs started
buying exception-rate (5.75-cent) cigarettes in wholesale
quantities for resale at shops designated for the 85.75-
cent rate.5,6 Using data on sales by tax rate obtained from
the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), Figure 2 illus-
trates the extent of this reselling for the 2006–2008 ﬁscal
years. This led to the negotiation of a partial wave of new
compacts, beginning in 2008, that established a 51.5-cent
state excise rate plus an additional 15-cent excise rate
imposed by the tribe.7,8
While this was happening, the state also saw a surge,9 now
ended,10 in “contraband” cigarette sales. Contraband ciga-
rettes are produced bymanufacturers who are noncompliant
with the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) and sold
without state or federal tax paid. Records on tribal tax
collections for these contraband sales, provided in legal
deposition by the Muscogee Nation, allowed the OTC to
estimate that approximately 1,680,000 cartons of these “tax-
free” cigarettes were sold by Muscogee smoke shops.11
Combining this information with Figure 2 data allows for
an estimation that 30% to 40% of the total sales volume for
Muscogee smoke shops during the 2007–2011 time frame
were attributable to contraband cigarette sales. Figure 3
shows that despite these reselling and illegal sales activities,
Oklahoma tax collections still increased dramatically after
the 2005 tax increase.
The focus of tobacco control research on Native
American cigarette sales has been on modeling purchas-
ing behavior and estimating sales quantities.12–14 The
epidemiology of Native American smoking has alsobeen studied.15 Smuggling and inter-jurisdictional com-
petition in cigarette sales has been extensively studied.16–18
Study authors are, however, unaware of any prior studies
that look at incentives for tribal cigarette taxation.
With this history of ﬁve different state excise tax rates
and large recent variation in illegal cigarette sales
quantities, Oklahoma provides unique terrain for ﬁeld
work on tribal cigarette taxation and pricing behavior.
This paper uses this variation to present data that suggest
how unilateral or coordinated increases in tribal cigarette
tax rates could help Oklahoma tribes substantially
increase cigarette tax revenue collections while also
improving tribal and public health. Clearly, the study
authors also see these implications, with some adapta-
tions, as generalizable to variety of other jurisdictions and
contexts.
Methods
OTC records indicated that there were 226 tribal tobacco retailers
and roughly 5,000 non-tribal retailers registered in the state as of
December 2009.3 Cigarette price information was collected via
convenience sampling on speciﬁc brands sold at tribal and non-
tribal retailers using site visits and phone requests. Data were
collected on ﬁve brands: (1) Marlboro, the leading “premium”
brand; (2) Marlboro Special Blend, a lower-price offering; (3) Pall
Mall, a widely available low-price brand; (4) Grand Prix, a generic
brand widely available at tribal outlets; and (5) Echo, a low-priced
regional brand.
Data collection was conducted in two waves: Wave 1 in
December 2010 and February–March 2011, and Wave 2 in
May–June 2011. The timing of these waves coincided with an
important change in tribal tobacco policy—the discontinuation of
“contraband” cigarette sales by the Muscogee Nation, veriﬁed bywww.ajpmonline.org
Figure 2. Proportions of cigarette tax Stamps sold, by price of stamp.
*A voter-approved increase in Oklahoma’s cigarette tax took effect on January 1, 2005, midway
through ﬁscal year 2005. Data Source: Oklahoma Tax Commission.
**A 77.25-cent rate for tribes that had not signed a compact was also introduced by the 2005 tax
increase, but eliminated on January 1, 2010.
Laux et al / Am J Prev Med 2015;48(1S1):S111–S119 S113site visit observation as occurring in mid to late March 2011. No
other changes in tribal, Oklahoma, or neighboring-state tax policy
occurred during the time frame of this study.
All Wave 1 data were collected via site visits to retailers in the
northeastern quarter of the state, a region that borders Kansas,
Missouri, and Arkansas. There were 142 registered tribal tobacco
retailers in this quadrant of the state, seven of which seemed
inactive. This resulted in a list of 135 shops (60% of all tribal smokeFigure 3. Cigarette sales and collections: FY2004–FY2009.
aA voter-approved increase in Oklahoma’s cigarette tax took effect on January 1, 2005, midway through
Commission.
January 2015shops in the state), of which 119 were
successfully visited. During each site visit,
researchers completed a form recording
shop name, construction type, time of
visit, externally displayed cigarette prices,
and price information for speciﬁed ciga-
rette brands (pack or carton, Marlboro or
Grand Prix). Researchers looked for the
sale of contraband cigarettes and pur-
chased at least one pack to verify state
tax rate for each shop, via the tax stamp.
After each visit to a tribal shop, researchers
stopped at the ﬁrst non-tribal outlet passed
on route (if within 5-minute driving time)
to record comparison prices. No cigarettes
were purchased at non-tribal outlets unless
researchers felt a given outlet might be
selling contraband or untaxed cigarettes.
Although this sometimes happened, and
some packs were purchased at non-tribal
outlets, no contraband sales at non-tribal
outlets were discovered in the ﬁeld work.During Wave 1, researchers followed up on 85 site visits with
phone calls. By comparing prices reported over the phone to prices
recorded during site visits, they were able to validate that most
shops would provide phone quotes, and that these were reliable.
For Wave 2, site visits were not attempted for tribal outlets that
were difﬁcult to access or that offered cigarettes only via relatively
high-priced vending machine sales. This limited site visits to 86
tribal shops, all in the northeastern quadrant of the state. All otherﬁscal year 2005. Data source: Oklahoma Tax
Laux et al / Am J Prev Med 2015;48(1S1):S111–S119S114tribal shops that could be reached (111 from across the state) were
contacted via telephone to request carton prices for the Marlboro
and Grand Prix brands. Using Stata (Version 10), mean prices
were then calculated for each cigarette brand, for tribal and non-
tribal outlets, within each tax stamp category, and for each wave.
This analysis was performed in 2013.Results
Of the 135 tribal smoke shops listed for site visits inWave
1, data were collected from 119 (88%). Of the remaining
16, ﬁve shops could not be found and 11 were no longer
selling (or had never sold) cigarettes. Of the 86 tribal
shops listed for site visits in Wave 2, 82 successful visits
were completed (95%). Of the 111 tribal shops called by
phone in Wave 2, price information was obtained from
74 (67%). A summary of the price data collected is
provided in Table 1.
For each brand and tax rate, Table 1 provides the
average price observed for carton and pack sales. Non-
tribal prices reﬂect data collected at non-tribal outlets
located near each tribal smoke shop visited. Thus, the
non-tribal averages posted under the 5.75-cent tax rate
are for non-tribal shops visited in the neighborhoods of
tribal shops facing the 5.75-cent state tax rate. All non-
tribal outlets pay the $1.03 state tax rate.
Table 1 shows that, for both Waves 1 and 2, the prices
for cigarette packs at the exception-rate (5.75-cent) shops
are set at levels that more than compensate for the
differential in tax levels relative to 25.75-cent and 51.5-
cent shops. This is illustrated by the listing of average
prices presented at the bottom of the table. Post-tax
margins, averaged across waves and brands, were 41, 24,
1, and 6 cents per pack larger, respectively, for cigarettes
sold with 25.75-cent, 51.5-cent, 85.75-cent, and $1.03
tribal outlets, than at exception-rate shops. This gap was
also roughly 10 cents larger for individual pack sales than
for carton sales. Thus, the tribes and smoke shops with
the lowest tax rates have not been leveraging their tax
advantage into higher proﬁt margins.
One possible explanation is that, as most of the
exception-rate shops are located within the surrounds
of one medium-sized town (Miami, in the northeastern
corner of the state), these shops face ﬁerce inter-tribal
competition. This conjecture is supported by comparing
Miami-area average prices to prices for the two
exception-rate shops located in the north-central part
of the state, near Tonkawa (Table 2). The more isolated
exception-rate shops had average per-pack prices 17
cents above the average for Miami-area shops.
During Wave 1, contraband cigarettes were being sold
(and often prominently advertised) at 14 of the 30
Muscogee smoke shops visited. These cigarettes had anaverage pack price of $2.79 and carton price of $23.86
(observed averages from project ﬁeld observations). As
mentioned above, all contraband sales by Muscogee shops
had ceased by Wave 2. The Cherokee had several smoke
shops in the Tulsa and Muskogee areas within 5 to
10miles of Muscogee competition selling contraband ciga-
rettes. The Sac & Fox jurisdictional area is on the western
frontier of the Muscogee area and they had some shops
relatively near such Muscogee outlets. The Osage had two
shops that could also have been considered within range of
contraband-selling outlets. For reference, all of these shops
are located in or around the city of Tulsa, with Muscogee
shops generally located in or to the south of Tulsa.
Table 3 highlights the price response to the discontin-
uation of contraband sales, comparing average prices for
Muscogee, Cherokee, Osage, and Sac & Fox outlets
(excluding a few Cherokee and Osage shops that paid
the 25.75-cent rate). To explain the small disparity in
price levels, note that Muscogee cigarettes were carrying
a $1.03 per pack state tax. Cigarettes for all other
included shops were carrying a 51.5-cent state excise
tax plus a 15-cent tribal tax across all waves.
Looking at the cross-wave price differentials presented
in the middle of Table 3, one sees very little response to the
discontinuation of contraband cigarette sales. Carton
prices tended to increase between waves in amounts that
were more pronounced but, on a per-pack basis, these
changes were modest. Increases in Cherokee and Musco-
gee prices are consistent with the idea that contraband
cigarettes were competing with tax-paid brands, but the
price changes are only modest, and do not carry over to
the Osage and Sac & Fox outlets. For Osage and Sac & Fox
shops, some differentiation is seen between price differ-
ences for the generic brand, Grand Prix, versus for the
premium brand, Marlboro. For the Osage, however, this is
seen only in individual pack pricing, implying that it may
reﬂect idiosyncratic, as opposed to strategic, pricing policy.
To further explore these results, investigators calcu-
lated price differentials at the shop level for the 14
Muscogee shops selling contraband cigarettes plus 11
non-Muscogee shops that provided the closest inter-
tribal competition. These results, at the bottom of
Table 3, show a strange diversion of the pricing for
individual pack sales from carton pricing (that may
reﬂect marketing strategy) but no coherent trend in price
changes coinciding with timing of the discontinuation of
contraband sales.
Discussion
The present analysis suggests that the cessation of
contraband cigarette sales by the shops of one major
tribe had only a minor impact on prices for the smokewww.ajpmonline.org
Table 1. Summary of observed cigarette pricesa
Tax stamp 0.0575 Tax stamp 0.2575 Tax stamp 0.5150 Tax stamp 0.8575 Tax stamp 1.0300
Tribal Nontribal Tribal Nontribal Tribal Nontribal Tribal Nontribal Tribal Nontribal
M n M n M n M n M n M n M n M n M n M n
Wave 1
Marlboro pack 4.19 (9) 5.35 (5) 4.82 (9) 5.58 (11) 4.91 (41) 5.58 (41) 5.14 (8) 5.63 (6) 5.27 (34) 5.61 (39)
Marlboro carton 40.38 (6) 45.34 (9) 48.99 (1) 46.28 (26) 50.55 (7) 47.63 (3) 49.22 (19) 48.39 (10)
Marl Spec Bl pack 3.14 (2) 3.60 (1) 4.69 (2) 3.86 (8) 4.57 (2) 3.85 (1) 4.19 (9) 4.49 (1)
Marl Spec Bl carton 37.08 (3) 35.42 (2) 39.95 (1) 37.99 (1)
Pall Mall pack 3.00 (5) 4.26 (4) 4.01 (5) 4.59 (10) 4.30 (10) 4.38 (22) 4.17 (3) 4.36 (4) 4.69 (11) 4.46 (23)
Pall Mall carton 29.33 (3) 38.73 (3) 38.60 (5) 36.11 (1) 41.53 (1) 42.66 (6) 36.43 (3)
Grand Prix pack 2.99 (4) 3.63 (10) 4.75 (2) 3.75 (47) 4.22 (6) 3.76 (8) 3.79 (2) 4.00 (21) 4.33 (4)
Grand Prix carton 29.17 (3) 33.11 (9) 33.48 (37) 39.99 (1) 36.69 (5) 37.27 (17)
Echo pack 2.85 (2) 3.43 (6) 3.96 (3) 3.51 (19) 3.87 (4) 3.58 (4) 3.77 (13) 4.20 (9)
Echo carton 27.24 (4) 31.32 (10) 32.33 (29) 31.5 (1) 35.43 (22)
Wave 2
Marlboro pack 4.43 (7) 4.92 (6) 4.83 (12) 5.62 (7) 4.90 (46) 5.68 (29) 5.16 (8) 5.45 (4) 5.24 (24) 5.67 (19)
Marlboro carton 40.75 (7) 45.75 (8) 50.94 (4) 46.47 (39) 49.86 (8) 47.78 (4) 50.87 (1) 50.02 (19) 49.42 (9)
Marl Spec Bl pack 3.66 (6) 4.40 (5) 4.26 (9) 4.70 (6) 4.21 (37) 4.86 (35) 4.20 (4) 4.73 (4) 4.67 (22) 4.87 (19)
Marl Spec Bl carton 36.17 (3) 39.86 (6) 37.29 (1) 39.53 (38) 39.82 (3) 40.55 (26) 43.48 (12) 40.29 (3)
Pall Mall pack 3.32 (7) 4.28 (6) 4.14 (9) 4.48 (6) 4.23 (27) 4.44 (30) 4.43 (5) 4.58 (5) 4.57 (15) 4.52 (20)
Pall Mall carton 29.05 (2) 29.69 1 38.93 (5) 40.05 (1) 37.93 (18) 33.97 (4) 41.53 (1) 44.11 (7) 36.26 (2)
Grand Prix pack 2.80 (1) 4.36 1 3.57 (9) 4.42 (3) 3.78 (45) 4.17 (6) 3.84 (7) 3.99 (18) 4.00 (5)
Grand Prix carton 29.93 (2) 34.07 (10) 35.99 (1) 34.51 (58) 38.99 (1) 36.30 (34) 38.03 (21)
Echo pack 2.96 (4) 3.39 (7) 4.14 (2) 3.55 (16) 4.03 (6) 3.65 (2) 3.75 (13) 4.15 (1)
Echo carton 26.82 (3) 25.49 (1) 32.21 (7) 32.79 (29) 32.05 (1) 34.21 (23)
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Table 2. Isolated versus competitive exception-rate shops
Miami area,
cross-wave
averages n
Tonkawa area,
cross-wave
averages n
Marlboro pack 4.22 (12) 4.58 (4)
Marlboro
carton
3.98 (10) 4.30 (3)
Grand Prix
pack
2.83 (3) 3.13 (2)
Grand Prix
carton
3.00 (1) 2.93 (4)
Echo pack 2.90 (4) 2.98 (2)
Echo carton 2.67 (4) 2.71 (3)
Simple
averagesa
3.27 3.44
aPrices for Marlboro Special Blend and Pall Mall brands were not
collected from both locations; thus, these are omitted from the table.
Averages price numbers are calculated by simple average across
brands and pack versus carton in the table.
Laux et al / Am J Prev Med 2015;48(1S1):S111–S119S116shops of neighboring tribes. This implies that, for most of
the state, inter-tribal price competition is not very strong
and that tribal revenues would almost certainly be
increased even via unilateral increases in tribal tax rates.
In an area where inter-tribal smoke shop competition is
more intense, as one seems to see in Miami, unilateral
increases in tribal tax rates might not be practical. Still,
increases in tribal tax rates (possibly with minimum price
agreements) could be arranged via inter-tribal negotia-
tion and compacting, with enforcement provisions.
Although such “price-ﬁxing” arrangements would be
illegal for private enterprises, the making of such
arrangements via tax treaty is not illegal. The scope for
such agreements would be limited only by the extent of
cross-border competition (from Missouri, in this case)
and competition from non-tribal shops. If necessary,
cross-subsidization schemes conditioned on sales quan-
tity data available to the OTC could be negotiated to
compensate individual tribes most adversely impacted by
coordinated tax and price increases. Communication
with tribal leadership about how these details could be
arranged is an ongoing activity of the project that funded
the research for this article.
The primary beneﬁts from increases in tribal cigarette
taxation and pricing would be realized in public health.
Time and again, taxation has been shown to be one of the
best tools available for reducing teen and adult smoking.2
Most studies of the price elasticity of demand for
cigarettes produce estimates in the range from –0.25 to
–0.50, implying that a 10% increase in the price of
cigarettes will reduce cigarette purchase quantities by
2.5% to 5%.19 These estimates measure the short-termwww.ajpmonline.org
Table 3. Summary of pricing by tribea
Mean prices by tribe and wave Marlboro pack Marlboro carton Grand Prix pack Grand Prix carton
Muscogee, Wave 1 5.29 49.32 3.97 37.43
(n/N¼25/31) (n/N¼11/31) (n/N¼15/31) (n/N¼13/31)
Muscogee, Wave 2 5.24 49.99 3.99 38.14
(24/31) (18/31) (18/31) (19/31)
Cherokee, Wave 1 4.84 45.27 3.71 34.10
(22/38) (15/38) (26/38) (21/38)
Cherokee, Wave 2 4.86 46.01 3.73 34.55
(26/38) (26/38) (27/38) (28/38)
Osage, Wave 1 4.85 46 3.96 33.92
(6/6) (1/6) (6/6) (3/6)
Osage, Wave 2 4.85 46.00 4.13 34.04
(5/6) (2/6) (4/6) (3/6)
Sac & Fox, Wave 1 5.06 48.32 3.74 35.26
(9/11) (6/11) (8/11) (6/11)
Sac & Fox, Wave 2 5.01 48.02 3.83 35.75
(8/11) (8/11) (8/11) (7/11)
Inter-wave price change (with carton prices normalized to the pack)b
Muscogee deltas –0.05 0.07 0.02 0.07
Cherokee deltas 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05
Osage deltas 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.01
Sac & Fox deltas –0.04 –0.03 0.08 0.05
Weighted averages –0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06
Inter-wave price changes comparing shops that sold illegal cigarettes to nearest competitor shops of different tribesc
Shops that had sold illegal cigarettes –0.04 0.10 –0.15 0.07
No. of price pairs (13) (4) (4) (6)
Competitor shops –0.14 –0.01 0.03 0.00
No. of price pairs (7) (4) (7) (6)
aInside parentheses are number of prices recorded for each product (n) divided by the total number of shops for the corresponding tribe, based on a
March 1, 2011, list from the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC). Note that, although the total number of registered vendors from the OTC list is 208,
site visits identiﬁed that some of these sell no cigarettes to the public or, as often happens in casinos, simply provide high-priced vending
machine sales.
bPrice change is calculated as Wave 2 price minusWave 1 price. The weights for the weighted averages use the cross-wave minimum of the number of
price observations for the product presentation and tribe.
cPrice change numbers for this subtable reﬂect averages across shops for which a prices were obtained in both waves. The "competitor shops" reﬂect
averages for the geographically nearest non-Muscogee tribal competitors to each of the "shops that had sold illegal cigarettes."
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takes time for smokers to successfully quit smoking, the
full impact of price increases would not likely be realized
until sometime after the price increase. Estimates of the
long-term (2 to 3 years after a price increase) price
elasticity tend to be higher and range from –0.5 to –0.8.20
Within this range, 50% to 60% of the reduction inJanuary 2015smoking is generally attributed to people quitting or not
starting (reduced participation), with the rest attributable
to reduced consumption by those who continue to
smoke.19,20 Using a –0.3 number as a middle-ground
prediction for the elasticity of participation and starting
from a $4.50 per pack current average price, a 50-cent
increase in the average price of cigarettes sold in
Laux et al / Am J Prev Med 2015;48(1S1):S111–S119S118Oklahoma would cause a 0.87 percentage point decline
(3.33% relative reduction) in Oklahoma smoking partic-
ipation rates. Using estimates from the Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids,21 this 3.33% reduction in smoking
rates would be associated with $96 million in annual
savings in smoking-caused healthcare expense and lost
productivity in Oklahoma. Given the higher incidence of
smoking for Native American residents of Oklahoma, the
incidence of these beneﬁts in health and productivity for
Oklahoma’s Native American communities would also
be expected to be higher.
A key limitation of this research is that study waves
occurred in proximity ﬁrst before and then after the
discontinuation of contraband cigarette sales. Thus, the
data may not reﬂect a full adjustment to this change in
the competitive environment. Further waves of data
collection, plus work analyzing data on sales quantities
per shop that has been made available, are in progress.
Seasonal effects are also a consideration and favor the
relative comparisons of Table 3 to the absolute compar-
isons of Table 1. Still, one would expect very little
seasonal variation in prices except perhaps at casino
locations and maybe for shops near the town of Miami.
Tribes use smoke shops as a means of generating
revenues and jobs, thus it seems that the fundamental
problem, from the tribal tax commissioner’s perspective,
is analogous to the problem of oligopoly pricing. Because
tribal smoke shops often suffer a disadvantage with
regard to location, these shops need to maintain a price
advantage. Clearly, tribes also want to avoid price
increases that will not be matched by other tribal and
non-tribal competitors. Some interesting work on har-
monization (and disparities) in cigarette pricing for the
European Union has recently been published,22 but the
authors are not aware of any such investigations regard-
ing Native American cigarette sales.
A key distinction between the tribal tax commis-
sioner’s problem and the simple oligopoly pricing prob-
lem (adapted frommonopoly pricing) is that only a small
portion of the revenue generated from smoke shop sales
is paid in tribal taxes. Consider, for example, the situation
of the Comanche Nation. The price of an average brand
of cigarettes at their shops is roughly $4 per pack. Of this,
15 cents7 goes as excise tax to the tribe, 51.5 cents is paid
to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, and the remaining
333.5 cents is split between the manufacturer, wholesaler,
vendor, MSA payments, and federal taxes. If the
Comanche double their excise rate to 30 cents, their
beneﬁt will be 15 cents per pack times total quantity sold
after the price increase. Their “cost” (or loss in revenue)
will be 15 cents times only the reduction in quantity sold.
Meanwhile, loss in revenue to other parties will be $3.85
per pack times the reduction in quantity sold. Thus, theComanche get 100% of the revenue increase from a tax
increase while bearing only about 4% of the cost. In this
example, the Comanche would need to face an extra-
ordinarily high price elasticity of demand in excess of
25.0 before this tax increase would cause them to lose tax
revenues. This could only happen if their smoke shops
face very direct and strong competition. Furthermore,
even in the face of strong inter-tribal competition, a
coordinated increase in tribal tax rates could still serve
to increase tribal revenue collections while improving
public health.Publication of this article was supported by the Oklahoma
Tobacco Research Center (OTRC), with funding from the
Oklahoma Tobacco Settlement Endowment Trust (TSET).
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